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Abstract
Refinement Types are a promising approach for checking behav-
ioral properties of programs written using advanced language fea-
tures like higher-order functions, parametric polymorphism and re-
cursive datatypes. The main limitation of refinement type systems
to date is the requirement that the programmer provides the types
of all functions, after which the type system can check the types
and hence, verify the program.
In this paper, we show how to automatically infer refinement
types, using existing abstract interpretation tools for imperative
programs. In particular, we demonstrate that the problem of refine-
ment type inference can be reduced to that of computing invari-
ants of simple, first-order imperative programs without recursive
datatypes. As a result, our reduction shows that any of the wide
variety of abstract interpretation techniques developed for impera-
tive programs, such as polyhedra, counterexample guided predicate
abstraction and refinement, or Craig interpolation, can be directly
applied to verify behavioral properties of modern software in a fully
automatic manner.
1. Introduction
Automatic verification of semantic properties of modern program-
ming languages is an important step toward reliable software
systems. For higher-order programming languages with inductive
datatypes or polymorphic instantiation, the main verification tool
has been type systems, which traditionally capture only coarse
data-type properties (such as ints are only added to ints), and
require the programmer to explicitly annotate program invariants if
more precise invariants about program computations are required.
For example, refinement type systems [33] associate data types
with refinement predicates that capture richer properties of program
computation. Using refinement types, one can state, for instance,
that a program variable xs has the refinement type “non-zero inte-
ger,” or that the integer division function has the refinement type
int → {ν :int | ν 6= 0} → int which states that the second ar-
gument must be non-zero. Then if a program with refinement type
type-checks, one can assert that there is no division-by-zero error in
the program. The idea of refinement types to express precise pro-
gram invariants is well-known [3, 10, 12, 13, 27, 33]. However, in
each of the above systems, the programmer must provide refine-
ments for each program type, and the type system checks the pro-
vided type refinements for consistency. We believe that this burden
of annotations has limited the widespread adoption of refinement
type systems.
For imperative programming languages, algorithms based on
abstract interpretation can be used to automatically infer many pro-
gram invariants [2,6,16], thereby proving many semantic properties
of practical interest. However, these tools do not precisely model
modern programming features such as closures and higher-order
functions or inductive datatypes, and so in practice, they are too
imprecise when applied to higher-order programs.
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Figure 1. RTI algorithm.
In this paper, we present an algorithm to automatically verify
properties of higher-order programs through refinement type in-
ference (RTI) by combining refinement type systems for higher-
order programs with invariant synthesis techniques for first-order
programs. Our main technical contribution is a translation from
type constraints derived from a refinement type system for higher-
order programs to a first-order imperative program with assertions,
such that the assertions hold in the first-order program iff there is
a refinement type that makes the higher-order program type-check.
Moreover, a suitable type refinement for the higher-order program
can be constructed from the invariants of the first-order program.
Thus, our algorithm replaces the manual annotation burden for re-
finement types with automatically constructed program invariants
on the translated program, thus enabling fully automatic verifica-
tion of programs written in modern languages.
The RTI algorithm (Figure 1) proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: Type-Constraint Generation. First, it performs Hindley-
Milner type inference [11] to construct ML types for the program,
and uses these types to generate refinement templates, i.e., types in
which refinement variables κ are used to represent the unknown
refinement predicates. Then, the algorithm uses a standard syntax-
directed procedure to generate subtyping constraints over the tem-
plates such that the program type checks (i.e., is safe) if the subtyp-
ing constraints are satisfiable [3, 19, 29, 33].
Step 2: Translation. Second, it translates the set of type constraints
to a first-order, imperative program over base values such that the
type constraints are satisfiable if and only if the imperative program
does not violate any assertions.
Step 3: Abstract Interpretation. Finally, an abstract interpretation
technique for first order imperative programs is used to prove that
the first order program is safe. The proof of safety produced by
this analysis automatically translates to solutions to the refinement
type variables, thus generating refinement types for the original ML
program.
The main contribution of this paper is the RTI translation al-
gorithm. The advantage of the translation is that it allows one
to apply any of the well-developed semantic imperative program
analyses based on abstract interpretation (e.g., polyhedra [9] and
octagons [6], counterexample-guided predicate abstraction refine-
ment (CEGAR) [2, 16], Craig interpolation [16, 22], constraint-
based invariant generation [4, 30] random interpretation [15], etc.)
to the verification of modern software with polymorphism, induc-
tive datatypes, and higher-order functions. Instead of painstakingly
reworking each semantic analysis for imperative programs to the
higher order setting, possibly re-implementing them in the process,
one can use our translation, and apply any existing analysis as is.
In fact, using the translation, our implementation directly uses a
CEGAR and interpolation based safety verification tool to verify
properties of OCAML programs.
In essence, our algorithm separates syntactic reasoning about
function calls and inductive data types (handled well by typing
constraints) from semantic reasoning about data invariants (handled
well by abstract domains). The translation from refinement type
constraints to imperative programs in Step 2 is the key enabler. The
translation, and the proof that the satisfiability of type constraints
and safety of the translated program are equivalent, are based on
the following observations.
The first observation is that refinement type variables κ define
relations over the value being defined by the refinement type and
the finitely many variables that are in-scope at the point where
the type is defined. In the imperative program, each finite-arity
relation can be encoded with a variable that encodes a relation.
Each refinement type constraint can be encoded as a straight-line
sequence that reads tuples from and writes tuples to the relation
variables, and the set of constraints can be encoded as a non-
terminating while-loop that in each iteration, non-deterministically
executes one of the blocks. Thus, the problem of determining the
existence of appropriate relations reduces to that of computing
(overapproximations) of the set of tuples in each relation variable
in the translated program (Theorem 1).
Our second observation is that if the translated program is in a
special read-write-once form, where within each straight-line block
a relation variable is read and written at most once, then one can
replace all relation-valued variables with variables whose values
range over tuples (Theorem 2). Moreover, we prove that we can,
without affecting satisfiability, preprocess the refinement typing
constraints so that the translated program is a read-write-once pro-
gram (Theorem 3). Together, the observations yield a simple and
direct translation from refinement type inference to simple impera-
tive programs.
We have instantiated our algorithm in a verification tool for
OCAML programs. Our implementation generates refinement type
constraints using the algorithm of [29], and uses the ARMC [28]
software model checker to verify the translated programs. This
allows fully automatic verification of a set of OCAML bench-
marks for which previous approaches either required manual an-
notations (either the refinement types [33] or their constituent
predicates [29]), or an elaborate customization and adaptation of
the counterexample-guided abstraction refinement paradigm [31].
Thus, we show, for the first time, how abstract interpretation can be
lifted “as-is” to the practical refinement type inference for modern,
higher-order languages.
While we have focused on the verification of functional pro-
grams, our approach is language independent, and requires only an
appropriate refinement type system for the source language.
let rec iteri i xs f =
match xs with
| [] -> ()
| x::xs’ -> f i x;
iteri (i+1) xs’ f
let mask a xs =
let g j y = a.(j) <- y && a.(j) in
if Array.length a = List.length xs then
iteri 0 xs g
Figure 2. ML Example
2. Overview
We begin with an example that illustrates how our refinement type
inference (RTI) algorithm combines type constraints and abstract
interpretation to automatically verify safety properties of functional
ML programs with higher-order functions and recursive structures.
We show that the combination of syntactic type constraints and
semantic abstract interpretation enables the automatic verification
of properties that are currently beyond the scope of either technique
in isolation.
An ML Example. Figure 2(a) shows a simple ML program that
updates an array a using the elements of the list xs. The program
comprises two functions. The first is a higher-order list indexed-
iterator, iteri, that takes as arguments a starting index i, a (poly-
morphic) list xs, and an iteration function f. The iterator goes over
the elements of the list and invokes f on each element and the in-
dex corresponding to the element’s position in the list. The second
is a client, mask, of the iterator iteri that takes as input a boolean
array a and a list of boolean values xs, and if the lengths match,
calls the indexed iterator with an iteration function g that masks the
jth element of the array.
Suppose that we wish to statically verify the safety of the array
reads and writes in function g; that is to prove that whenever g is
invoked, 0 ≤ j < len(a). As this example combines higher-order
functions, recursion, data-structures, and arithmetic constraints on
array indices, it is difficult to analyze automatically using either
existing type systems or abstract interpretation implementations in
isolation. The former do not precisely handle arithmetic on indices,
and the latter do not precisely handle higher-order functions and are
often imprecise on data structures. We show how our RTI technique
can automatically prove the correctness of this program.
Refinement Types. To verify the program, we compute program
invariants that are expressed as refinements of ML types with pred-
icates over program values [3,19,29]. The predicates are additional
constraints that must be satisfied by every value of the type. A
base value, say of type int, can be described by the refinement
type {ν :int | p} where ν is a special value variable representing
the type being defined, and p is a refinement predicate which con-
strains the range of ν to a subset of integers. For example, the type
{ν :int | 0 ≤ ν < len(a)} denotes the set of integers c that are
between 0 and the value of the expression len(a). Thus, the un-
refined type int abbreviates {ν :int | true}, which does not con-
strain the set of integers. Base types can be combined to construct
dependent function types, written x :T1 → T2, where T1 is the type
of the domain, T2 the type of the range, and where the name x for
the formal parameter can appear in the refinement predicates in T2.
For example, the type
x :{ν :int | ν ≥ 0} → {ν :int | ν = x+ 1}
is the type of a function which takes a non-negative integer param-
eter and returns an output which is one more than the input. In the
following, we write τ for the type {ν :τ | true}. When ν and τ are
clear from the context, we write {p} for {ν :τ | p}.
Safety Specification. Refinement types can be used to specify
safety properties by encoding pre-conditions into primitive oper-
ations of the language. For example, consider the array read a.(j)
(resp. write a.(j)← e) in g which is an abbreviation for get a j
(resp. set a j e). By giving get and set the refinement types
a :αarray → {ν :int | 0 ≤ ν < len(a)} → α ,
a :αarray → {ν :int | 0 ≤ ν < len(a)} → α→ unit ,
we can specify that in any program the array accesses must be
within bounds. More generally, arbitrary safety properties can be
specified by giving assert the appropriate refinement type [29].
Safety Verification. The ML type system is too imprecise to prove
the safety of the array accesses in our example as it infers that g
has type j :int→ y :bool→ unit, i.e., that g can be called with
any integer j. If the programmer manually provides the refine-
ment types for all functions and polymorphic type instantiations,
refinement-type checking [3, 12, 33] can be used to verify that the
provided types were consistent and strong enough to prove safety.
This is analogous to providing pre- and post-conditions and loop-
invariants for verifying imperative programs. For our example, the
refinement type system could check the program if the programmer
provided the types:
iteri :: i :int→ xs :{ν :α list | 0 ≤ len(ν)} →
(j :{i ≤ ν < len(xs)} → α→ unit)→ unit
g :: j :{0 ≤ ν < len(a)} → bool→ unit
Here, we omitted refinement predicates that are equal to true, e.g.,
for i in the type of iteri.
Automatic Verification via RTI. As even this simple example il-
lustrates, the type annotation burden for verification is extremely
high. Instead, we would like to verify the program without requir-
ing the programmer to provide every refinement type. The RTI al-
gorithm proceeds in three steps. First, we syntactically analyze the
source program to generate subtyping constraints over refinement
templates. Second, we translate the constraints into an equivalent
simple imperative target program. Third, we semantically analyze
the target program to determine whether it is safe, from which we
conclude that the constraints are satisfiable and hence, the source
program is safe. Next, we illustrate these steps using Figure 2 as
the source program.
2.1 Step 1: Constraint Generation
In the first step, we generate a system of refinement type constraints
for the source program [19, 29]. To do so, we (a) build templates
that refine the ML types with refinement variables that stand for
the unknown refinements, and (b) make a syntax-directed pass over
the program to generate subtyping constraints that capture the flow
of values. For the functions iteri and g from Figure 2, with the
respective ML types
i :int→ xs :α list→ (j :int→ α→ unit)→ unit
j :int→ bool→ unit
we would generate the respective templates
i :int→ xs :{0 ≤ len(ν)} → (j :{κ1} → α→ unit)→ unit
j :{κ2} → bool→ unit
Notice that these templates simply refine the ML types with refine-
ment variables κ1, κ2 that stand for the unknown refinements. For
clarity of exposition, we have added the refinement true for some
variables (e.g., for the type α and bool); our system would auto-
matically infer the unknown refinements. We model the length of
lists (resp. arrays) with an uninterpreted function len from the lists
(resp. arrays) to integers, and (again, for brevity) add the refinement
stating xs has a non-negative length in the type of iteri.
After creating the templates, we make a syntax-directed pass
over the program to generate constraints that capture relationships
between refinement variables. There are two kinds of type con-
straints – well-formedness and subtyping.
Well-formedness Constraints capture scoping rules, and ensure
that the refinement predicate for a type can only refer to variables
that are in scope. Our example has two constraints:
i :int; xs :α list ⊢ {ν :int | κ1} (w1)
a :bool array; xs :α list ⊢ {ν :int | κ2} (w2)
The first constraint states that κ1, which represents the unknown
refinement for the first parameter passsed to the higher-order iter-
ator iteri, can only refer to the two program variables that are
in-scope at that point, namely i and xs. Similarly, the second con-
straint states that κ2, which refines the first argument of g, can only
refer to a and xs, which are in scope where g is defined.
Subtyping Constraints reduce the flow of values within the
program into subtyping relationships that must hold between the
source and target of the flow. Each constraint is of the form
G ⊢ T1 <: T2
whereG is an environment comprising a sequence of type bindings,
and T1 and T2 are refinement templates. The constraint intuitively
states that under the environment G, the type T1 must be a subtype
of T2. The subtyping constraints are generated syntactically from
the code. First consider the function iteri. The call to f generates
G ⊢ {ν = i} <: {κ1} (c1)
where the environment G comprises the bindings
G
.
= i :{true}; xs :{0 ≤ len(ν)};
x :{true}; xs′ :{0 ≤ len(ν) = len(xs)− 1}
the constraint ensures that at the callsite, the type of the actual is a
subtype of the formal. The bindings in the environment are simply
the refinement templates for the variables in scope at the point the
value flow occurs. The type system yields the information that the
length of xs′ is one less than xs as the former is the tail of the
latter [18, 33]. Similarly, the recursive call to iteri generates
G ⊢ {j : κ1 :→α→ unit} <:
{(j :κ1 → α→ unit)[i+ 1/i][xs
′/xs]}
which states that type of the actual f is a subtype of the third
formal parameter of iteri after applying substitutions [i+ 1/i]
and [xs′/xs] that capture the passing in of the actuals i + 1
and xs′ for the first two parameters respectively. By pushing the
substitutions inside and applying the standard rules for function
subtyping, this constraint simplifies to
G ⊢ {κ1[i/i+ 1][xs/xs
′]} <: {κ1} (c2)
Next, consider the function mask. The array accesses inside g
generate the “bounds-check” constraint
G′; j :{κ2}; y :{true} ⊢ {ν = j} <: {0 ≤ ν < len(a)} (c3)
where G′ .= a :bool array; xs :{0 ≤ len(ν)} has bindings for
the other variables in scope. Finally, the flow due to the third
parameter for the call to iteri yields
G′; len(a) = len(xs) ⊢ {j :κ2 → τ} <: {(j :κ1 → τ )[0/i]}
where for brevity we write τ for bool→ unit, and omit the trivial
substitution [xs/xs] due to the second parameter. The last conjunct
in the environment captures the guard from the if under whose
auspices the call occurs. By pushing the substitutions inside and
applying standard function subtyping, the above reduces to
G′; len(a) = len(xs) ⊢ {κ1[0/i]} <: {κ2} (c4)
For brevity we omit trivial constraints like · ⊢ int <: int. If the
set of constraints constructed above is satisfiable, then there is a
valid refinement typing of the program [29], and hence the program
is safe.
2.2 Step 2: Translation to Imperative Program
Determining the satisfiability of the constraints requires semantic
analysis about program computations. In the second step, our key
technical contribution, we show a translation that reduces the con-
straint satisfiability problem to checking the safety of a simple, im-
perative program. Our translation is based on two observations.
Refinements are Relations. The first observation is that type re-
finements are defined through relations: the set of values denoted
by a refinement type {ν :τ | p} where p refers to the program vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn of the respective base types τ1, . . . , τn is equiva-
lent to the set
{t0 | ∃(t1, . . . , tn) s.t. (t0, t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Rp ∧
t1 = x1 ∧ . . . tn = xn
}
where Rp is an (n + 1)-ary relation in τ × τ1 × . . . × τn defined
by p. For example, the set of values denoted by {ν :int | ν ≤ i}
is equivalent to the set:
{t0 | ∃t1 s.t. (t0, t1) ∈ R≤ ∧ t1 = i} ,
where R≤ is the standard ≤-ordering relation over the integers. In
other words, each refinement variable κ can be seen as the projec-
tion on the first co-ordinate of a (n+ 1)-relation over the variables
(ν, x1, . . . , xn), where x1, . . . , xn are the variables in the well-
formedness constraint for κ (i.e., the variables in scope of κ). Thus,
the problem of determining the satisfiability of the constraints is
analogous to the problem of determining the existence of appropri-
ate relations.
Relations are Records. The second observation is that the problem
of finding appropriate relations can be reduced to the problem
of analyzing a simple imperative program with variables ranging
over relations. In the imperative program, each refinement variable,
standing for an n-ary relation, is translated into a record variable
with n-fields. Each subtyping constraint can be translated into a
block of reads-from and writes-to the corresponding records. The
set of all tuples that can be written into a given record on some
execution of the program defines the corresponding relation. The
entire program is an infinite loop, which in each iteration non-
deterministically chooses a block of reads and writes defined by
a constraint.
The arity of a relation, and hence the number of fields of the
corresponding record, is determined by the well-formedness con-
straints. For example, the constraint (w1) specifies that κ1 corre-
sponds to a ternary relation, that is, a set of triples where the 0th
element (corresponding to ν) is an integer, the 1st element (corre-
sponding to i) is an integer, and the 2nd element (corresponding to
xs) is a list. We encode this in the imperative program via a record
variable κ1 with three fields κ1.0, κ1.1 and κ1.2.
Figure 3 shows the imperative program translated from the con-
straints for our running example. We use the subtyping constraints
to define the flow of tuples into records. For example, consider the
constraint (c2) which is translated to the block marked /*c2*/.
Each variable in the type environment is translated to a correspond-
ing variable in the program. The block has a sequence of assign-
ments that define the environment variables. For example, we know
i has type int, so there is an assignment of an arbitrary integer
to i. When there is a known refinement in the binding, the non-
deterministic assignment is followed by an assume operation (a
conditional) that establishes that the value assigned satisfied the
given refinement. For example xs gets assigned an arbitrary value,
but then the assume establishes the fact that the length of xs is non-
negative. Similarly xs′ gets assigned an arbitrary value, that has
non-negative length and whose length is 1 less than that of xs. The
LHS of (c2) reads a tuple from κ1 whose first and second fields are
assumed to equal the i+ 1 and xs′ respectively. Finally, the triple
(ν,i, xs) is written into the record κ1 which is the RHS of (c2).
Next, consider the translated block for the bounds-check con-
straint (c3). Here, the translation is as before but the RHS is a
known refinement predicate (that stipulates the integer be within
bounds). In this case, instead of writing into the record that defines
the RHS, the translation contains an assertion over the correspond-
ing variables that ensures that the refinement predicate holds.
Relational vs. Imperative Semantics. There is a direct correspon-
dence between the refinement-relations and the record variables
when the translated program is interpreted under a Relational se-
mantics, where (1) the records range over (initially empty) sets of
tuples, (2) each write adds a new tuple to the record’s set, and,
(3) each read non-deterministically selects some tuple from the
record’s set. Under these semantics, we can show that the con-
straints are satisfiable iff the imperative program is safe (i.e., no
assert fails on any execution) (Theorem 1).
Unfortunately, these semantics preclude the direct application
of mature invariant generation and safety verification techniques
e.g., those based on abstract interpretation or CEGAR-based soft-
ware model checking, as those techniques do not deal well with
set-valued variables. We would like to have an imperative seman-
tics where each record contains a single value, the last tuple written
to it. We show that there is a syntactic subclass of programs for
which the two semantics coincide. That is, a program in the sub-
class is safe under the imperative semantics if and only if it is safe
under the set-based semantics (Theorem 2). Furthermore, we show
a technique that ensures that the translated program belongs to the
subclass (Theorem 3).
The attractiveness of the translation is that the resulting pro-
grams fall in a particularly pleasant subclass of programs which do
not have any advanced language features like higher-order func-
tions, polymorphism, and recursive data structures, or variables
over complex types such as sets, that are the bane of semantic anal-
yses. Thus, the translation yields simple imperative programs to
which a wide variety of semantic analyses directly apply.
2.3 Step 3: Invariant Generation.
Together these results imply that we can run off-the-shelf abstract
interpretation and invariant generation tools on the translated pro-
gram, and use the result of the analysis to determine whether the
original ML program is typable.
For the translated program shown in Figure 3, the CEGAR-
based software model checker ARMC [28] finds that the assertion
is never violated, and computes the invariants:
κ1.1 ≤ κ1.0 ∧ κ1.0 < len(κ1.2)
0 ≤ κ2.0 < len(κ2.1)
which, when plugging in ν, i and xs for the 0th, 1st, 2nd fields
of κ1 and ν, a for the 0th, 1st fields of κ2 respectively, yields the
refinements
κ1
.
= i ≤ ν < len(xs) κ2
.
= 0 ≤ ν < len(a)
loop{ /∗c1∗/
i← nondet();
xs← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs));
xs′ ← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs′) = len(xs)− 1);
ν ← nondet(); assume(ν = i);
κ1 ← (ν, i, xs)
[] /∗c2∗/
i← nondet();
xs← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs));
xs′ ← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs′) = len(xs)− 1);
(t0, t1, t2)← κ1;
assume(t1 = i+ 1);
assume(t2 = xs′);
ν ← t0;
κ1 ← (ν, i, xs)
[] /∗c3∗/
a← nondet();
xs← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs));
(t0, t1, t2)← κ2;
j← t0;
assert(0 ≤ j < len(a))
[] /∗c4∗/
a← nondet();
xs← nondet(); assume(0 ≤ len(xs));
assume(len(a) = len(xs));
(t0, t1, t2)← κ1;
assume(t1 = 0);
assume(t2 = xs);
ν ← t0;
κ2 ← (ν, a, xs)
}
Figure 3. Translated Program
which suffice to typecheck the original ML. Indeed, these predi-
cates for κ1 and κ2 are easily shown to satisfy the constraints (c1),
(c2), (c3), and (c4).
3. Constraints
We start by formalizing constraints over types refined with predi-
cates. To this end, we make precise the notions of refinement predi-
cates (Section 3.1), refinement types (Section 3.2), constraints over
refinement types and the notion of satisfaction (Section 3.3).
A discussion of how such constraints can be generated in a
syntax-guided manner from program source is outside the scope
of this paper; we refer the reader to the large body of prior research
that addresses this issue [3, 19, 29, 33].
Notation. We use uppercase (Z) to denote sets, lowercase z to
denote elements, and 〈Z〉 for a sequence of elements in Z.
3.1 Refinement Logic
Figure 4 shows the syntax of refinement predicates. In our discus-
sion, we restrict the predicate language to the typed quantifier-free
logic of linear integer arithmetic and uninterpreted functions. How-
ever, it is straightforward to extend the logic to include other do-
mains equipped with effective decision procedures and abstract in-
terpreters.
Types and Environments. Our logic is equipped with a fixed set of
types denoted τ , comprising the basic types int for integer values,
bool for boolean values, and ui, a family of uninterpreted types
that are used to encode complex source language types such as
products, sums, polymorphic type variables, recursive types etc..
We assume there is a fixed set of uninterpreted functions. Each
uninterpreted function f has a fixed type τf .= 〈τ if〉 → τ of . An
environment is a sequence of variable-type bindings.
Expressions and Predicates. In our logic, expressions e comprise
variables, linear arithmetic (i.e., addition and multiplication by con-
stants), and applications of uninterpreted functions f. Note that as is
standard in semantic program analyses, complex operations like di-
vision or non-linear multiplication be modelled using uninterpreted
functions. Finally, predicates comprise atomic comparisons of ex-
pressions, or boolean combinations of sub-predicates. We write
true (resp. false) as abbreviations for 0 = 0 (resp. 0 = 1).
Well-formedness. We say that a predicate p is well-formed in an
environment Γ if every variable appearing in p is bound in Γ and p
is “type correct” in the environment Γ.
Validity. For each type τ , we write U(τ ) to denote the set of
concrete values of τ . An interpretation σ is a map from variables x
to concrete values, and functions f to maps from U(〈τ if〉) to U(τ of ).
We say that σ is valid under Γ if for each x :τ ∈ Γ, we have
σ(x) ∈ U(τ ). We say that a predicate p is valid in an environment
Γ, if σ(p) evaluates to true for every σ valid under Γ.
3.2 Refinement Types
Figure 4 shows the syntax of refinement types and environments.
Refinements. A refinement r is either a predicate p drawn from
our logic, or a refinement variable with pending substitutions
κ[y1/x1] . . . [yn/xn]. Intuitively, the former represent known re-
finements (or invariants), while the latter represent the unknown in-
variants that hold of different program values. The notion of pend-
ing substitutions [1,19] offers a flexible way of capturing the value
flow that arises in the context of function parameter passing (in the
functional setting), or assignment (in the imperative setting), even
when the underlying invariants are unknown.
Refinement Types and Environments. A refinement type
{ν :τ | r} is a triple consisting of a value variable ν denoting the
value being described by the refinement type, a type τ describing
the underlying type of the value, and a refinement r. A refinement
environment G is a sequence of refinement type bindings.
The value variables are special variables distinct from the
program variables, and can occur inside the refinement pred-
icates. Thus, intuitively, the refinement type describes the set
of concrete values of the underlying type τ which addition-
ally satisfy the refinement predicate. For example, the refinement
type: {ν :int | ν 6= 0} describes the set of non-zero integers and,
{ν :int | ν = x+ y} describes the set of integers whose value
equals the sum of the values of the (program) variables x and y.
Note that path-sensitive branch information can be captured
by adding suitable bindings to the refinement environment. For
example, the fact that some expression is only evaluated under the
if-condition that x > 100 can be captured in the environment via a
refinement type binding xb :{ν :bool | x > 100}.
3.3 Refinement Constraints and Solutions
Figure 4 shows the syntax of refinement constraints. Our refinement
type system has two kinds of constraints.
Subtyping Constraints are of the form
G ⊢ {ν :τ | r1} <: {ν :τ | r2}
Intuitively, a subtyping constraint states that when the program
variables satisfy the invariants described in G, the set of values
described by the refinement r1 must be subsumed by the set of
values described by the refinement type r2.
Well-formedness Constraints are of the form Γ ⊢ {ν :τ | r}. In-
tuitively, a well-formedness constraints states that the refinement r
must be a well-typed predicate in the environment G extended with
the binding ν :τ for the value variable.
Embedding. To formalize the notions of constraint validity and sat-
isfaction, we embed subtyping constraints into our logic. We define
the function Emb(·) that maps refinement types, environments and
subtyping constraints to predicates in our logic.
Emb({ν :τ | p})
.
= p
Emb(x :T ;G)
.
= Emb(T )[ν/x] ∧ Emb(G)
Emb(∅)
.
= true
Emb(G ⊢ T1 <: T2)
.
= Emb(G) ⇒ Emb(T1)⇒ Emb(T2)
Similarly, we define the function Shape(·) that maps refinement
types and environments to types and environments in our logic.
Shape({ν :τ | p})
.
= τ
Shape(x :T ;G)
.
= x :Shape(T );Shape(G)
Shape(∅)
.
= ∅
Validity. A subtyping constraint G ⊢ T1 <: T2 that does
not contain refinement variables is valid if the predicate
Emb(G ⊢ T1 <: T2) is valid under environment Shape(G). A
well-formedness constraint Γ ⊢ {ν :τ | p} that does not contain
refinement variables is valid if the predicate p is well-formed in the
environment Γ.
Relational Interpretations. We assume, without loss of generality,
that each refinement variable κ is associated with a unique well-
formedness constraint x1 :τ1; . . . ;xn :τn ⊢ {ν :τ0 | κ} called
the well-formedness constraint for κ. In this case, we say κ has
arity n + 1. Furthermore, we assume that wherever a κ of arity
n+ 1 appears in a subtyping constraint, it appears with a sequence
of n pending substitutions [y1/x1] . . . [yn/xn]. This assumption
is without loss of generality, as we can enforce it with trivial
substitutions of the form [xi/xi]. A relational interpretation for κ
of arity n+1, is an (n+1)-ary relation in U(τ0)× . . .×U(τn). A
relational model is a map from refinement variables κ to relational
interpretations.
Constraint Satisfaction. A set of constraints C is satisfiable if
for all interpretations for uninterpreted functions f, there exists a
relational model S such that, when each occurrence of a refinement
type {ν :τ | κ[y1/x1] . . . [yn/xn]} in C is substituted with
{ν :τ | ∃t1, . . . , tn.S(κ)(ν, t1, . . . , tn) ∧ t1 = y1 ∧ . . . tn = yn)}
every subtyping constraint after the substitution is valid. In this
case, we say that S is a solution for C.
4. Imperative Programs
RTI translates the satisfiability problem for refinement type con-
straints to the question of checking the safety of an imperative pro-
gram in a simple imperative language IMP. In this section, we for-
malize the syntax of IMP programs and define the Relational se-
mantics and the Imperative semantics.
4.1 Syntax
Figure 5 shows the syntax of IMP programs. An instruction (I)
is a sequence of assignments, assumptions and assertions. A pro-
gram (P) is an infinite loop over a block, whose body is a
non-deterministic choice between a finite number of instructions
I1, . . . , In. Next, we describe the different kinds of instructions.
For ease of notation, we assume that there is only one base type τ ,
and let V denote the set of values of type τ .
Variables. IMP programs have two kinds of variables. (1) base vari-
ables, denoted by ν, x, y and t (and subscripted versions thereof),
which range over values of type τ . (2) relation variables, denoted
by κ, each of which have a fixed arity n and range over tuples of
values or sets of n-tuples of values depending on the semantics.
Base Assignments. IMP programs have two kinds of assignments
to base variables. Either (1) an expression over base variables
(cf. Figure 4) is evaluated and assigned to the base variable, or,
τ ::= Types:
| int base type of integers
| bool base type of booleans
| ui complex uninterpreted type
Γ ::= Environments:
| x :τ ;Γ binding
| ∅ empty
e ::= Expressions:
| x variable
| n integer
| e1 + e2 addition
| n× e affine multiplication
| f(〈e〉) function application
p ::= Predicates:
| e1 ⊲⊳ e2 comparison
| ¬p negation
| p1 ∧ p2 conjunction
| p1 ⇒ p2 implication
r ::= Refinements:
| p predicate
| κ[y1/x1] . . . [yn/xn] ref. var. with substitutions
T ::= {ν :τ | r} Refinement Types
G ::= Refinement Environments:
| x :T ;G binding
| ∅ empty
c ::= G ⊢ T1 <: T2 Subtype Constraints
w ::= Γ ⊢ T WF Constraints
Figure 4. Predicates, Refinements and Constraints.
I ::= Instructions:
| x← e assign expr
| x← nondet() havoc
| (t0, . . . , tn)← κ get tuple
| κ← (x0, . . . , xn) set tuple
| assume(p) assume
| assert(p) assert
| I1; I2 sequence
P ::= loop{I1[] . . . []In} Program
Figure 5. Imperative Programs: Syntax
(2) an arbitrary value of the appropriate base type is assigned
to the base variable, i.e., the variable is “havoc-ed” with a non-
deterministically chosen value.
Tuple Assignments. The operations get tuple and set tuple respec-
tively read a tuple from and write a tuple to a relation variable.
Assumes and Asserts. IMP programs have the standard assume
and assert instructions using predicates over the base variables (cf.
Figure 4). We write skip as an abbreviation for assume(0 = 0).
4.2 Relational Semantics
We define the Relational semantics as a state transition system. In
this semantics, κ variables range over sets of tuples over V .
Relational States. A state s♯ in the Relational semantics is either
the special error state E or a map from program variables to values
such that every base variable is mapped to a value in V , and every
relation variable of arity n is mapped to a (possibly empty) set of
tuples in V n. Let Σ♯ be the set of all Relational-program states.
For a state s♯ which is not E , variable x and value v we write
s♯[x 7→ v] for the map which maps x to v and every other key x′ to
s♯(x′). We lift maps s♯ from base variables to values to maps from
expressions (and predicates) to values in in the natural way.
Initial State. The initial state s♯0 of an IMP program in the Rela-
tional semantics is a map in which every base variable is mapped
to a fixed value from V , and every relation variable is mapped to
the empty set.
Transition Relation. The transition relation is defined through a
Post♯ operator, shown in Figure 6, which maps a state s♯ and an
instruction I to the set of states that the program can be in after
executing the instruction from the state s♯. We lift Post♯ to a set of
states Σˆ♯ ⊆ Σ♯ in the natural way:
Post
♯(Σˆ♯, I)
.
=
⋃
{Post♯(s♯, I) | s♯ ∈ Σˆ♯}
Notice that the program halts if a get instruction is executed with
an empty relation variable, or an assume(p) is executed in a state
that does not satisfy p.
Safety. Let P be the program loop{I1[] . . . []In}. The set of
Relational-reachable states of P, denoted Reach♯(P) is defined by
induction as:
Reach♯(P, 0)
.
= {s♯0}
Reach♯(P,m+ 1)
.
=
⋃
{Post♯(Reach♯(P,m),Ij) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
Reach♯(P)
.
=
⋃
{Reach♯(P,m) | 0 ≤ m}
A program P is Relational-safe if E 6∈ Reach♯(P).
4.3 Imperative Semantics
Next, we define the Imperative semantics, as a state transition
system. In this semantics, κ variables κ range over tuples over V .
Imperative States. In the Imperative semantics, each state s is
either the special error state E or a map from program variables
to values such that every base variable is mapped to a value in V ,
and every relation variable of arity n is mapped either to a tuple in
V n or to the special undefined value ⊥. Let Σ denote the set of all
a Imperative-program states.
Initial State. The initial state s0 of an IMP program in the Impera-
tive semantics is a map in which every base variable is mapped to
a fixed value from V , and every relation variable is mapped to ⊥.
Transition Relation. The transition relation is defined using a Post
operator, which is identical to Post♯ in the Relational semantics
except for the tuple-get and tuple-set instructions. Figure 6 shows
the operator Post for get and set operations. Again, Post is lifted
to a set of states in the natural way. Notice that the program halts if
a get instruction is executed with an undefined relation variable, or
an assume(p) is executed in a state that does not satisfy p.
Safety. Let P be the program loop{I1[] . . . []In}. The set of
Imperative-reachable states of P, denoted Reach(P) is defined by
induction as:
Reach(P, 0)
.
= {s0}
Reach(P,m+ 1)
.
=
⋃
{Post(Reach(P,m), Ij) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
Reach(P)
.
=
⋃
{Reach(P,m) | 0 ≤ m}
A program P is Imperative-safe if E 6∈ Reach(P).
5. From Type Constraints to IMP Programs
In this section we formalize the translation from type constraints
into IMP programs and prove that the constraints are satisfiable if
and only if the translated program is safe.
Refinement Type Translation
[[{ν :τ | p}]]get
.
= ν ← nondet();
assume(p)
[[{ν :τ | p}]]set
.
= assert(p)
[[{ν :τ | κ[y1 . . . yn/x1 . . . xn]}]]get
.
= (t0, . . . , tn)← κ;
assume(y1 = t1);
.
.
.
assume(yn = tn);
ν ← t0
[[{ν :τ | κ[y1 . . . yn/x1 . . . xn]}]]set
.
= κ← (ν, y1, . . . , yn)
Binding Translation
[[x :T ;G]]
.
= [[τ ]]get; x← ν; [[G]]
[[·]]
.
= skip
Constraint Translation
[[G ⊢ T1 <: T2]]
.
= [[G]]; [[T1]]get; [[T2]]set
Constraint Set Translation
[[{c1, . . . , cn}]]
.
= loop{[[c1 ]][] . . . [][[cn]]}
Figure 7. Translating Constraints to IMP Programs
5.1 Translation
Figure 7 formalizes the translation from (a set of) refinement type
constraints C to an IMP program [[C]]. We use the WF constraints to
translate each relation variable κ of arity n+1 into a corresponding
tuple variable κ of arity n+ 1.
The translation is syntax-driven. We translate each subtyping
constraint G ⊢ T1 <: T2 into a straight-line block of instructions
with three parts: a sequence of instructions that establishes the
environment bindings ([[G]]), a sequence of instructions that “gets”
the values corresponding to the LHS ([[T1]]get) and a sequence
of instructions that “sets” the (LHS) values into the appropriate
RHS ([[T2]]set). The translation for a set of constraints is an infinite
loop that non-deterministically chooses among the blocks for each
constraint.
Each environment binding gets translated as a “get”. Bindings
with unknown refinements are translated into tuple-get operations,
followed by assume statements that establish the equalities corre-
sponding to the pending substitutions. Bindings with known refine-
ments are translated into non-deterministic assignments followed
by a assume that enforces that the refinement holds on the non-
deterministic value.
Each “set” operation to an unknown refinement is translated
into a tuple-set instruction that writes the tuple corresponding to
the pending substitutions into the translated tuple variable. Finally,
each “set” operation corresponding to a known refinement is trans-
lated to an assert instruction; intuitively, in such constraints the
RHS defines an upper bound on the set of values populating the
type, and the assert serves to enforce the upper bound require-
ment in the translated program.
The correctness of the procedure is stated by the following
theorem.
THEOREM 1. C is satisfiable iff [[C]] is Relational-safe.
The proof of this theorem follows from the properties of the
following function α that maps a set Σˆ♯ ⊆ Σ♯ of Relational-states
Common Operations
Post♯(E, I)
.
= {E}
Post♯(s♯, I1; I2)
.
= Post♯(Post♯(s♯, I1), I2)
Post♯(s♯, x ← e)
.
= {s♯[x 7→ s♯(e)]}
Post♯(s♯, x ← nondet())
.
= {s♯[x 7→ c] | c ∈ V }
Post♯(s♯, assume(p))
.
=
{
{s♯} if s♯(p) = true
∅ otherwise
Post♯(s♯, assert(p))
.
=
{
{s♯} if s♯(p) = true
{E} otherwise
Tuple Operations: Relational Semantics
Post♯(s♯, (t0, . . . , tn)← κ)
.
= {s♯[t0 7→ v0] . . . [tn 7→ vn] | (v0, . . . , vn) ∈ s♯(κ)}
Post♯(s♯, κ← (x0, . . . , xn))
.
= {s♯[κ 7→ s♯(κ) ∪ {(s♯(x0), . . . , s♯(xn))}]}
Tuple Operations: Imperative Semantics
Post(s, (t0, . . . , tn) ← κ)
.
=
{
{s[t0 7→ v0] . . . [tn 7→ vn]} if s(κ) = (v0, . . . , vn)
∅ if s(κ) = ⊥
Post(s, κ← (x0, . . . , xn))
.
= {s[κ 7→ (s(x0), . . . , s(xn))]}
Figure 6. Relational and Imperative Semantics: Other cases of Post identical to Post♯
to constraint solutions:
α(Σˆ♯)
.
= λκ.
⋃
{s♯(κ) | s♯ ∈ Σˆ♯}
The function α enjoys the following property, which can be proven
by induction on the construction of Reach♯, that relates the satisfy-
ing solutions of the constraints to the Relational-reachable states of
the translated program. Theorem 1 follows from the following ob-
servations. If S satisfies C then α(Reach♯([[C]]))(κ) ⊆ S(κ) for
all κ. If E 6∈ Reach♯([[C]]) then α(Reach♯([[C]])) satisfies C.
5.2 Read-Write-Once Programs
At this point, via Theorem 1, we have reduced checking satisfia-
bility of type constraints to the problem of verifying assertions of
IMP programs under the (non-standard) Relational semantics. Un-
fortunately, under these semantics, the program contains variables
(κ) which range over sets of tuples. This makes it inconvenient to
directly apply abstract-interpretation based techniques for imper-
ative programs which typically assume the (standard) Imperative
semantics; each technique has to be painstakingly adapted to the
non-standard semantics.
We would be home and dry if we could prove the equivalence
of the Relational and Imperative semantics; that is, if we could
show that an IMP program was Relational-safe if and only if it was
Imperative safe. Unfortunately, this is not true.
Example. Consider the IMP program:
loop{
ν ← nondet();
κ← (ν)
[]
(t0)← κ;
ν ← t0; x← ν;
(t0)← κ;
ν ← t0; y ← ν;
assert(x = y)
}
This program is not Relational-safe as the set-operation in the first
instruction populates κ with the set of all integers, and the get-
operation in the second instruction can assign different values to
integer values to x and y. However the program is Imperative-safe
as whenever the second instruction executes, κ will be undefined
or contain some arbitrary integer that is assigned to both x and y,
which causes the assert to succeed.
This example pinpoints exactly why the two semantics differ. In
the Relational semantics, in any given loop iteration, different gets
on the same κ can return different tuples, while in the Imperative
semantics the gets are correlated and return the same tuple.
Read-Write-Once Programs. An IMP instruction is a read-write-
once instruction if any relation variable κ is read from and written
to at most once in the instruction. That is, read-write-once means
at most one write and at most one read (and not at most one read
or write). An IMP program is a read-write-once program if each
instruction in its loop is a read-write-once instruction. We can
show that for Read-Write-Once IMP programs the Relational and
Imperative semantics are equivalent.
THEOREM 2. If P is a read-write-once IMP program then P is
Relational-safe iff P is Imperative-safe.
To prove this theorem, we formalize the connection between the
reachable states under the two different semantics, using the func-
tion Expand, which maps a Relational-state to a set of Imperative
states:
Expand(s♯)
.
=


s |
s(x) = s♯(x) for base variables
s(κ) = 〈v〉 if 〈v〉 ∈ s♯(κ)
s(κ) = ⊥ if s♯(κ) = ∅
s = E if s♯ = E


We lift the function to sets of Relational states in the natural way:
Expand(Σˆ♯)
.
=
⋃
{Expand(s♯) | s♯ ∈ Σˆ♯}
Next, we can show that read-write-once instructions enjoy the fol-
lowing property, by case splitting on the form of I .
LEMMA 1. [Step] If I is a read-write-once instruction then
Expand(Post♯(s♯, I)) = Post(Expand(s♯), I).
We use this property to show that the reachable states under the
different semantics are equivalent.
LEMMA 2. If P = loop{I1[] . . . []In} is a read-write-once pro-
gram, then Expand(Reach♯(P)) = Reach(P).
PROOF. To prove that Reach(P) ⊆ Expand(Reach♯(P)), we show
∀m : Reach(P, m) ⊆ Expand(Reach♯(P))
by straightforward induction on m, noting that s0 ∈ Expand(s♯0),
and Post(Expand(s♯), I) ⊆ Post♯(s♯, I) for any Relational-state
s♯ ∈ Σ♯, instruction I, and any program P (not necessarily read-
write-once).
To show inclusion in the other direction, we prove
∀m : Expand(Reach♯(P,m)) ⊆ Reach(P)
by induction on m. For the base case,
Expand(Reach♯(P, 0)) = Reach(P, 0) ⊆ Reach(P)
by the definition of the initial states. By induction, assume that
Expand(Reach♯(P,m)) ⊆ Reach(P)
Let s′ ∈ Expand(Reach♯(P,m+ 1)). By Lemma 1, either s′ is
already in Reach♯(P,m), in which case the inductive hypothesis
applies and hence s′ ∈ Reach(P), or
s′ ∈ Post(Expand(Reach♯(P,m), Ij)
for some j. That is, there is a s ∈ Expand(Reach♯(P,m) such that
s′ ∈ Post(s,Ij). From the induction hypothesis s ∈ Reach(P). As
Reach(P) is closed under Post, we conclude s′ ∈ Reach(P). ✷
5.3 Cloning
At this point, we have shown that the Imperative semantics of read-
write-once programs are equivalent to the Relational semantics. All
that remains is to show that the translation procedure of Figure 7
produces read-write-once programs. Unfortunately, this is not true.
Example. Consider the following constraints:
∅ ⊢ {κ} , ∅ ⊢ {true} <: {κ} , x :κ;y :κ ⊢ {true} <: {x = y}
It is easy to check that on the above constraints, the translation
procedure yields the IMP program from the previous example,
which is not read-write-once.
The reason the translated program is not a read-write-once pro-
gram is that there can be constraints G ⊢ T1 <: T2 in which κ
occurs in multiple places within G and T1.
To solve this problem, we can simply clone the κ variables that
occur multiple times inside a constraint, and use different clones at
each occurrence! We formalize this as a procedure Clone that maps
a finite set of constraints to another finite set. The procedure works
as follows. For each κ that is read upto n times in some constraint,
we make n clones, κ1, . . . , κn, and
1. for the ith occurence of κ within any constraint, we use the ith
clone κi (instead of κ), and,
2. for each constraint where κ appears on the right hand side,
we make n clones of the constraints where in the ith cloned
constraint, we use κi (instead of κ).
The first step ensures that each κ is read-once in any constraint,
and the second step ensures that the clones correspond to exactly
the same set of tuples as the original variable κ. We can prove that
Clone enjoys the following properties.
THEOREM 3. Let C be a finite set of constraints.
1. [[Clone(C)]] is a read-write-once program.
2. Clone(C) is satisfiable iff C is satisfiable.
It is easy to verify that [[Clone(C)]] is a read-write-once pro-
gram. Furthermore, any satisfying solution for the original con-
straints can be mapped directly to a solution for the cloned con-
straints. To go in the other direction, we must map a solution that
satisfies the cloned constraints to one that satisfies the original con-
straints. This is trivial if the solution for the cloned constraints
maps each clone κi to the same set of tuples. We show that if the
cloned constraints have a satisfying solution, they have a solution
that satisfies the above property. To this end, we prove the follow-
ing lemma that states that for any set of constraints, the satisfying
solutions are closed under intersection.
Program Time Invariant
(sec) Refinement Types
max 0.091 κ1.1 ≤ κ1.0 ∧ κ1.2 ≤ κ1.0
κx
.
= true, κy
.
= true, κ1
.
= x ≤ v ∧ y ≤ v
sum 0.071 0 ≤ κ2.0 ∧ κ2.1 ≤ κ2.0
κk
.
= true, κ2
.
= 0 ≤ v ∧ k ≤ v
foldn 0.060 0 ≤ κi.0 ∧ 0 ≤ κ3.0 ∧ κ3.0 < κ3.2
κi
.
= 0 ≤ v, κ3
.
= 0 ≤ v ∧ v < n
arraymax 0.135 0 ≤ κ4.0 ∧ 0 ≤ κ5.0 ∧
0 ≤ κ6.0 ∧ κg.0 < len(κg.1)
κ40
.
= ≤ v, κ5
.
= 0 ≤ v,
κ6
.
= 0 ≤ v, κg
.
= v < len(a)
mask 0.098 κ1.0 < len(κ1.4) ∧ κ1.1 ≤ κ1.0 ∧
0 ≤ κ2.0 ∧ κ2.0 < len(κ2.3)
κ1v < len(xs) ∧ i ≤ v,
κ2
.
= 0 ≤ v ∧ v < len(a)
samples 0.117 0 ≤ κ2.0 ∧ κ2.0 < len(κ2.4) ∧
0 ≤ κ3.0 ∧ κ3.0 < len(κ3.3) ∧ 0 ≤ κ6.0
κ2
.
= 0 ≤ v ∧ v < len(b),
κ3
.
= 0 ≤ v ∧ v < len(a), κ6
.
= 0 ≤ v
Table 1. Experimental evaluation using a predicate abstraction-
based verification tool on examples from [29]. The third column
presents the invariant for the translated program, and the resulting
refinement types.
LEMMA 3. If S1 and S2 are solutions that satisfyC then S1∩S2 .=
λκ.S1(κ) ∩ S2(κ) satisfies C.
Thus if S satisfies the cloned constraints then by symmetry and
Lemma 3 the solution that maps each cloned variable to∩ni=1S(κi)
also satisfies the cloned constraints, and hence, directly yields a
solution to the original constraints.
Finally, as a corollary of Theorems 1,2,3 we get our main result
that reduces the question of refinement type constraint satisfaction,
to that of safety verification.
THEOREM 4. C is satisfiable iff [[Clone(C)]] is Imperative-safe.
While we state Theorems 1 and 3 as preserving satisfiability, the
proof shows how the solutions can be effectively mapped between
C and [[C]] (or [[Clone(C)]]. In particular, while the intersection
of two non-trivial solutions can be a trivial solution, it would be
guaranteed that in that case, the trivial solution satisfiesC. Stated in
terms of invariants, Lemma 3 states the observation that that there
may be several non-comparable inductive invariants to prove a
safety property, but in that case, the intersection of all the inductive
invariants is also an inductive invariant.
6. Experiments
We have implemented a verification tool for OCAML programs
based on RTI. We use the liquid types infrastructure implemented
in DSOLVE [29] to generate refinement type constraints from
OCAML programs. We use ARMC [28], a software model checker
using predicate abstraction and interpolation-based refinement, as
the verifier for the translated imperative program.
Table 1 shows the results of running our tool on a suite of small
OCAML examples from [29]. For array manipulating programs, the
safety objective is to prove array accesses are within bounds. For
MAX we prove that the output is larger than input values. For SUM
we prove that the sum is larger than the largest summation term.
Table 2 presents the running time of our tool on the benchmark
programs for the Depcegar verifier [31]. We observe that despite of
our blackbox treatment of ARMC as a constraint solver we obtain
competitive running times compared to Depcegar on most of the
examples (Depcegar uses a customized procedure for unfolding
Program Time # iterations # predicates
boolflip.ml 2.17s 7 21
sum.ml 0.24s 5 14
sum-acm.ml 0.11s 1 3
sum-all.ml 3.51s 10 26
mult.ml 4.67s 10 25
mult-cps.ml 780.24s 11 27
mult-all.ml 18.44s 9 24
boolflip-e.ml 0.65s
sum-e.ml 0.01s
sum-acm-e.ml 0.02s
sum-all-e.ml 0.79s
mult-e.ml 0.01s
mult-cps-e.ml 7.69s
mult-all-e.ml 144.93s
Table 2. Experimental evaluation of our tool on Depcegar bench-
marks [31]. The third column presents the number of abstraction
refinment iterations required by ARMC. The last column gives the
number of predicates discovered by ARMC. For the programs with
suffix “-e”, which are incorrect, we omit the number of iterations
and predicates and only show the time required by ARMC to find
a counterexample.
constraints and creating interpolation queries that yield refinement
types).
Most of the predicates discovered by the interpolation-based
abstraction refinement procedure implemented in ARMC fall into
the fragment “two variables per inequality.” The example MASK
required a predicate that refers to three variables, see κ1. While our
initial experiments used a CEGAR-based tool, we expect optimized
abstract interpreters for numerical domains to also work well for
this class of properties.
7. Extensions and Related Work
7.1 Completeness
The soundness of safety verification for higher-order programs for
any domain follows from the soundness of constraint generation
(e.g., Theorem 1 in [29]) and Theorem 4. Since the safety verifi-
cation problem for higher-order programs is undecidable, the tech-
nique cannot be complete in general. Even in the finite-state case,
in which each base type has a finite domain (e.g., booleans), com-
pleteness depends on the generation of type constraints. For exam-
ple, in our examples and in our implementation, we have assumed a
context insensitive constraint generation from program syntax, i.e.,
we have not distinguished the types of the same function at differ-
ent call points. This entails a loss of information, as the following
example demonstrates. Consider
let check f x y = assert (f x = y) in
check (fun a -> a) false false ;
check (fun a -> not a) false true
where the builtin function assert has the type {ν :bool | ν} →
unit. The refinement template for check generated by our con-
straint generation process is
(x : {ν :bool | κ1} → {κ2})→ {κ3} → {κ4} → unit
which is too weak to show that the program is safe. This is because
the template “merges” the two call sites for check.
One way to get context sensitivity is through intersection types
[12, 14, 20, 25]. For the above example, we can show type safety
using the following refined type for check:
∧ (x : bool → {ν = x})→ {¬ν} → {¬ν} → unit
(x : bool → {ν = ¬x})→ {¬ν} → {ν} → unit
It is important to note that Theorems 1 and 2 hold for any set
of constraints. Thus, one way to get completeness in the finite
state case is to generate refinement templates using intersection
types, perform the translation to IMP programs, and then using a
complete invariant generation technique for finite state systems.
The key observation (made in [20]) that ensures a finite number
of constraints, is that there is at most a finite number of “contexts”
in the finte state case, and hence a finite number of terms in the
intersection types. The bad news is that the bound on the number
of contexts is expn(k), where n is the highest order of any function
in the program, k is the maximum arity of any function in the
program, and expn(k) is a stack of n exponentials, defined by
exp0(k) = k, and expn+1(k) = 2expn(k).
Fully context-sensitive constraints are used in [20] to show com-
pleteness in the finite case, at the price of expn(k) in every case,
not just the worst case. In our exposition and our implementation,
we have traded off precision for scalability: while we lose pre-
cision by generating context-insensitive constraints, we avoid the
expn blow-up that comes with full context sensitivity. However, it
has been shown through practical benchmarks that since the types
themselves capture relations between the inputs and outputs, the
context-insensitive constraint generation suffices to prove a variety
of complex programs safe [3, 18, 29].
When considering completeness properties in special cases, we
point out completeness wrt. the discovery of refinement predicates
in octagons/difference bounds abstract domains [24] and template-
based invariant generation for linear arithmetic [7] and extensions
with uninterpreted function symbols [5], which carries over from
respective verification approaches.
7.2 Related Work
Higher-Order Programs. Kobayashi [20, 21] gives an algorithm
for model checking arbitrary µ-calculus properties of finite-data
programs with higher order functions by a reduction to model
checking for higher-order recursion schemes (HORS) [26]. For
safety verification, RTI shows a promising alternative.
First, the reduction to HORS critically depends on a finite-state
abstraction of the data. In contrast, our reduction defers the data ab-
straction to the abstract interpreter working on the imperative pro-
gram, thus enabling the direct application of abstract interpreters
working over infinite domains. Since abstract interpreters over infi-
nite abstract domains are strictly more powerful than (infinite fam-
ilies of) finite ones [8], our approach can be strictly more powerful
for infinite-state programs.
Second, in the translation of an abstracted program to a HORS,
this algorithm eliminates Boolean variables by enumerating all
possible assignments to them, giving an exponential blow-up from
the program to the HORS. In contrast, our technique preserves the
Boolean state symbolically, enabling the use of efficient symbolic
algorithms for verification. For example, for the simple example:
let f b1 ... bn x =
if (b1 || ... || bn) then lock x;
if (b1 || ... || bn) then unlock x
in let f (*) ... (*) (newlock ())
where we wish to prove that lock and unlock alternate. Kobayashi’s
translation [20] gives an exponential sized HORS, with a version of
f for each assignment to b1,...,bn. In contrast, our reduction pre-
serves the source-level expressions and is linear, and amenable to
symbolic verification techniques (e.g., BDDs). Previous experience
with software model checking [2, 16, 17] shows that the number of
reachable states is often drastically smaller than 2p where p is the
number of Booleans. Thus, the pre-processing step that enumerates
Booleans may not lead to a scalable implementation.
Might [23] describes logic-flow analysis, a general safety verifi-
cation algorithm for higher-order languages, which is the product of
a k-CFA like call-strings analysis and a form of SMT-based pred-
icate abstraction (together with widening). In contrast, our work
shows how higher-order languages can be analyzed directly via ab-
stract analyses designed for first-order imperative languages.
Inference of refinement types using conterexample-guided tech-
niques was recentrly identified as a promising direction [31,32]. In
contrast, our approach is not limited to CEGAR and facilitates the
applicability of a wide range abstract interpretation techniques for
precise reasoning about program data.
Software Verification. This work was motivated by the recent suc-
cess in software model checking for first-order imperative pro-
grams [2, 6, 16, 22], and the desire to apply similar techniques to
modern programming languages with higher order functions. Our
starting point was refinement types [14, 19], implemented in de-
pendent ML [33] to give strong static guarantees, and the work on
liquid types [18, 29] that applied predicate abstraction to infer re-
finement types. By enabling the application of automatic invariant
generation from software model checking, RTI reduces the need
for programmer annotations in refinement type systems.
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